All right, so go ahead.

THE COURT:

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We're here on the request of the defense to dismiss one of your claims, Ms. Bey. Let me recount for everyone briefly the history in this matter.

The plaintiff has brought a number of Section 1983 claims against several NYPD officers and ACS workers.

Previously I had sua sponte, meaning on my own, dismissed most of the defendants from the amended complaint. That happened back on July 15, 2019. However, I did allow six claims against ten defendants to proceed.

As relevant here, I allowed amongst others, a claim of unlawful entry to go forward against six of the defendants. And that relates to an incident that occurred on May 2, 2018. However, as the parties may recall in my decision, I did note in a footnote that because the issue here was whether or not there was a validly signed or issued warrant that permitted the defendants to enter Ms. Bey's home, I indicated that if the defendants located that warrant they could reapply for dismissal, remove for dismissal of that claim relating to the May 2, 2018 unlawful entry. So that's what brings us here today.

The defendant has located a warrant relating to that entry; namely, the one on May 2, 2018. It appears to be signed by a Justice of the Supreme Court of New York.

MS. BEY: Family Court, your Honor.

THE COURT: Family Court, my apologies. And that

Judge is Jacqueline D. Williams and was apparently issued on April 13, 2018, but apparently executed on May 2, 2018. And specifically and amongst other things, it says that agents for the Administration for Children Services --

MS. BEY: It's an order to produce, your Honor, this is not a warrant.

THE COURT: It does say, ma'am, that they are authorized to enter the above premise to determine if the children are present and to access the home and to proceed thereafter with a child protective investigation.

MS. BEY: This --

THE COURT: And it extends not only to ACS workers but persons conducting a child protective investigation accompanied by police. So I guess the person conducting a child protective investigation, I presume modifies the staff of ACS, but they can be accompanied by police. And we do have police officers who are named as defendants in this case, and were I believe involved in that May 2, 2018 entry into Ms. Bey's home.

Now Ms. Bey, you've produce in response the first page of what appears to be the same exact warrant. And you indicate I believe in handwritten notes that this was the document dropped on your floor or the floor of your living room on May 2.

MS. BEY: Right.

You don't, however, include the second 1 THE COURT: 2 page which is part of the defendant's exhibit. It shows the 3 signature, which is the issue in dispute here. 4 The document that I have here is MS. BEY: 5 two-sided. I'm assuming when I made the copy I didn't make it 6 two-sided, which is the reason it didn't show. 7 Hang on. So your copy is signed as THE COURT: 8 well, correct? 9 Right. MS. BEY: 10 THE COURT: By the judge. 11 MS. BEY: Yes. 12 Tell me why it is that that doesn't THE COURT: 13 basically eliminate your claim or provide a basis for 14 dismissing your claim where you say the officers and ACS 15 entered your house unlawfully? 16 MS. BEY: Your Honor, I also presided first of all 17 in Family Court and that day produced this document 18 understates that in section, in part, F it states they have to 19 have a search warrant in order to enter. It specifically says 20 that the law enforcement shall remain with the children if 21 children are believed to be present. If the child protective 22 services investigator has requested lawful --23 THE COURT: Wait, we have a court reporter. 24 slower. Start over again. 25 In part F of Family Court at 1034 section

MS. BEY:

two -- before I say that, the basis of my claim was under 1 2 Fourth Amendment violation. So it started under Fourth 3 Amendment where they have to have a warrant that is supported by officer affirmation. Family Court at part section two, 4 5 part F, states the law enforcement shall remain where the 6 children are, the child or children are believed to be present 7 if child protective services investigator has requested law 8 enforcement assistance. 9 THE COURT: Stop, stop, stop, I'm pausing you 10 because remember. 11 MS. BEY: I speak so fast. 12 Everybody does. THE COURT: Just pause. Can we have the last sentence read back? 13 14 (Whereupon, the record was read.) 15 MS. BEY: Provided, however, that the law 16 enforcement may not enter the premise where the child or 17 children are believed to be without a search warrant or a 18 constitutionally based reason. 19 None of my children were screaming or crying. 20 was no blood at the scene. There was nothing going on but me 21 educating my children because my children are homeschooled. 22

Also I provided another document in a subsequent case, which was filed during this case, that says even if, even if they want to say they had authorization to enter, this document says for the children to be produced at the court and

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for authorization to enter the premise, which is the first document they do not have.

The first document only says for the children to be presented not at the home but at the Bedford office, where Ms. Antoine works.

Furthermore, if I was required to bring the children to the Bedford office, I would have to know that I have to bring them. I had no idea that this happened. I knew nothing about this document at all until they came through my fire escape window and threw it on my floor. I had no opportunity to even produce the children at the office.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. BEY: Because I knew nothing about it.

Also the Family Court Act sets the precedent that law enforcement can be there but they can't enter without a search warrant from the criminal court. They have to go in front of the criminal court and get that search warrant to enter the home. They had no warrant.

When the officer came through the window I said,

Excuse me officer, where is your search warrant? He said to

me flat out, I don't have to have one. I'm the police.

THE COURT: Okay, all right. I understand what your reasoning is, let me hear from the defense.

MS. ROLON: Yes, your Honor. It is our understanding that, our argument is there was a signed entry

order and that entry order suffices for the search warrant 1 2 requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically to the 3 Family Court Act that the plaintiff mentioned, it indicates in 4 Section C that the procedure for issuing an entry order under 5 the Act follows the same guidelines as Section 690 of the 6 Criminal Procedure Act -- Criminal Procedure Law; therefore, 7 establishing the same probable cause standard at least under 8 the Fourth Amendment. 9

All right. THE COURT:

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Also, your Honor, I would like to simply MS. ROLON: note, under Sutherland that the Family Court entry order is equivalent of a search warrant. As well as under the recent case decided by Southern District of New York Judge Paul Engelmayer, who found that the Family Court entry order is the equivalent and cited the exact language found on the entry order.

In the Shaheed case Judge Engelmayer found that the language of the entry order, the exact language in this entry order, was sufficient to also establish it as a search warrant under the Sutherland standard.

THE COURT: All right. Sir, are you here for this case?

> AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

THE COURT: Is he with you?

MS. BEY: Yes.

Did you want to say anything further?

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MS. ROLON: Only to establish that, yes, the warrant we provided and the warrant that Ms. Bey has in her hands at this moment is signed by the judge.

THE COURT: Your argument, aside from the case law which you cite appropriately, is that this warrant which is issued by the Family Court provides probable cause as required under the Fourth Amendment to justify the entry into Ms. Bey's home?

MS. ROLON: It expressly says so on the Family Court order, there was probable cause to believe that there was an abuse or neglected child in the premise.

THE COURT: All right. So Ms. Bey, recognizing that you're not a lawyer but obviously have been able to ably represent yourself this far, the defense is correct that the case law pretty uniformly recognizes that a warrant such as this issued by a Family Court based upon its finding of probable cause and authorizing the entry into a person's home accompanied by police for a particular purpose, here to determine that the children are present and to access the home and to proceed thereafter with the child protective investigation, is recognized as being equivalent to a warrant under the Fourth Amendment; including as you alluded, to a search warrant.

So while you're focused on the particular language referring to a search warrant, the law recognizes that some, a

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document like this issued by a court of competent jurisdiction does meet that requirement. That's what I have to look at when as now you are trying to sue members of ACS and the police for allegedly violating your Fourth Amendment right.

The fact that they were acting pursuant to this warrant, which was issued by the Family Court for Fourth

Amendment purposes makes it fine; or therefore, it's not violative of the Fourth Amendment. Do you understand that?

MS. BEY: I understand what you're saying, your Honor. But I would also like to put on the record that this case was dismissed prima facie. During that trial the defendant Antoine stated on the record that they did not have authority to enter on May 2, 2018.

THE COURT: Who said that?

MS. BEY: The child protective services agent,
Ms. Josephine Antoine stated on the record that she did not
have authority to enter, during the trial. It was dismissed
prima facie.

THE COURT: Whatever her belief might have been, I'm looking at a warrant that authorized her and the other officers entry into your apartment. So her belief doesn't govern here. But rather this document, which I accept as being authentic since it is the same one that was left with you at the residence. And furthermore, even if the officers mistakenly thought that this was sufficient for Fourth

Amendment purposes, that would entitle them to qualified immunity. There is no reason for them to have known that this didn't authorize their entry into your home because on its face it says they could enter for the particular purpose indicated in the warrant. And that there was probable cause to believe that an abuse or neglected child may being at the premise.

MS. BEY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Hang on. Whatever happened with the family law action after that does not undermine the appropriateness for Fourth Amendment purposes of the officers' conduct.

Now, I can't remember if you still have some kind of a false arrest claim, or due process, or malicious prosecution claim in this matter relating to what happened after the May 2, 2018 entry. That may still be viable.

MS. BEY: The due process was for this part of the claim as well. That's the whole basis of my entire claim, that I never had an opportunity to even be heard. So it was under Fourth and Fifth.

Also, I would just like to question the fact that I am showing two different Family Court incidents in two different cases. But I'm showing that one paper, which is from the same court, maybe a different judge, it says clearly on the front of this paper: Authorize investigation to enter

1 | the premise. On the top of this --

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THE COURT: What document are you holding?

3 MS. BEY: This is the same kind of document which is 4 the one that the defense presented.

THE COURT: But a different date.

MS. BEY: Different date. And it says on it for the children to be produced at the court and for authorization for entry.

THE COURT: Is this the April 16, 2019 --

MS. BEY: Document, yes.

THE COURT: -- warrant.

MS. BEY: My whole thing is that's where my understanding came from, that it had to have that language on the paperwork. Even though it says, this is a -- the specific, the outline of this paperwork, it stayed the same, they don't usually change it.

THE COURT: Ms. Bey, the fact that it's different doesn't make it insufficient. It's possible that they changed forms. But the bottom line is, and the only question I have to resolve, is whether or not it satisfies the Fourth Amendment. And the document we're focused on, the one from May 2, 2019, does satisfy the Fourth Amendment; in that it contains a finding of probable cause and an order authorizing the agents of ACS and police officers to enter your home for purposes of determining if children are present.

So I understand exactly what you're saying, those two documents look different, but that in and of itself doesn't make the one we're focused on, the one from May 2 relating to May 2, insufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. Do you understand that?

MS. BEY: Somewhat, not really.

THE COURT: Right. As I said before, I understand you're not a lawyer and your focus, not inappropriately --

MS. BEY: It was not the focus on the fact, because there is a lot of things that occurred that is not inside my complaint. In order for me to bring to the Court and say this is what happened and this is what made me put it in the complaint, it's irrelevant right now. I don't have those documents in front of the Court at the very moment.

But this paper that I have here now is actually a four-page document, this is only one page, there were four pages. Before I appeared in court, because all of this happened without a petition being filed in the court, when I arrived at the court and up went to receive copies of this document I received four unsigned copies. The signature did not appear on this document until after May 8, which was the date that the petition actually occurred.

So my whole thing was the validity of this document was in question. Right now I can't prove that because I don't have those documents that was printed out from the court at

1 that very moment.

THE COURT: Now you're talking about the April 30, 2018 order of Judge Williams?

MS. BEY: Right. What I'm saying to the Court now, when my children were removed on May 4, as stated in the complaint, I appeared in the court on May 8. When I appeared in the court on May 8, I went to the court's record room and requested copies of this document. Because this was just thrown — this is the actual document thrown on the floor.

When I received the document it was a four-page document that said application for entry order. The gentleman who works in the court printed out four different copies of this four-page document. And at that time none of them were signed. He was like, this is weird. I said, it is weird to me as well.

But then after the case was completely done, I went to request the documents again. That's when it had the signature on it.

Then I have another document, which is not this one but another one that has the same Outlook on it with the seal on it. Because I went back to the same location where you request documents from the court.

Right now I'm still saying they don't -- I request the validity of this paper because at the time while I was going through this case it wasn't signed. Then the lady

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- stated that she didn't have the authority. But then later on down the line it's signed and she had authority.
- This judge didn't handle the case at all. It was handled by Elizabeth Bonnet.
 - THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. A document was dropped on your floor at the time --
 - MS. BEY: This here.

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- 8 THE COURT: Hang on. The May 2 entry. And you said
 9 this one here, if you'll hand it up to my Deputy I'd
 10 appreciate that.
- 11 MS. BEY: This is the actual document dropped on the 12 floor.
- 13 THE COURT: We're going to make a copy of that so
 14 the report is clear.
- And that document that I'm observing, it now has or bears a signature of Jacqueline D. Williams.
 - So on the day that your home was entered, the same exact warrant was provided to you as the defense is producing to me now.
 - MS. BEY: Right, it was thrown on the floor.
 - THE COURT: Yet you're saying there is reason to doubt the authenticity of the document, because when you showed up on May 8 at the courthouse the clerk somehow printed up unsigned copies for you.
- MS. BEY: Right. I have unsigned copies at home.

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But I didn't produce that to the Court before today. I felt like it would be improper to bring that today and say, hey, these are the documents they gave me at court. But I have documents that were not signed on May 8 when I went to that court, those documents were not signed.

THE COURT: Let me say this, Ms. Bey. I don't know what to make of whatever you received or have at home. But the bottom line is I have nothing before me that suggests that the warrant that you received on the day in question, and then the warrant that is identical to it, a copy thereof being produced by the defense now, is not authentic. It certainly was at the time it was served on you, signed, or a copy was signed such that the officers who executed it would have believed it to be valid.

So at a minimum, those officers would be entitled to qualified immunity believing that they were executing a valid warrant.

Further for my purposes even today, I don't have anything before me that suggests it's not authentic. I know you're saying that there may be blank copies that you received, but they are not in the record right now. And this issue was the subject of the proceeding today, and has been the subject of the papers that have been submitted back and forth, and yet you didn't produce it.

So like I said, I just don't have anything right now

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to cast any doubt on the authenticity of the warrant that was delivered to you or provided to you on May 2 and that is being produced for me now both by you and by the defense. It bears a signature of a judge of the Family Court. It authorizes the entry into your home that did occur on May 2, 2018.

So regrettably to you, I have to dismiss the claim relating to the unlawful entry, or the claim alleging unlawful entry against six different defendants in this case. You still have other claims.

Let me clarify. With respect to those other claims, or all of the other claims, I had mentioned due process but that claim was dismissed before, and I think appropriately. What I wasn't sure of was whether or not you've been arrested in connection with this entry on May 2, 2018; and apparently you were not. So there are no false arrest claims being made on the basis of that entry into your home.

So let me recite my decision so that it's clear upon what basis I'm making it.

The first issue is whether or not the defendant officers could rely on the warrant in making the entry on May 2, 2018 and whether their reliance on it violated the Fourth Amendment. I find that the officers were entitled to rely on the warrant. And that further, the warrant authorized entry and satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Now, it's been clarified what wasn't clear in the

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complaint, that the plaintiff, Ms. Bey herself, received a full copy of the warrant, which bears the signature of Judge Williams. And as I said before, appears to be authentic. So I am incorporating by reference this warrant upon which Ms. Bey has relied in her complaint.

As stated by the Second Circuit in Brass V. American Film Technologies Incorporated 987 F.2d 142 at 150, a Second Circuit case from 1993: A Court may refer to documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference to matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Or to documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.

So I think that doctrine plainly covers this search warrant, which was referenced by Ms. Bey in her complaint, and obviously forms the core of her unlawful entry claim.

Furthermore, stated by the Second Circuit DiFolco V.

MSNBC Cable LLC 622 F.3rd 104 at 111, Second Circuit 2010:

Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the Court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document integral to the complaint.

Under both doctrines, I find that the warrant dated April 30, 2018, should be and is therefore incorporated in the complaint.

Now given that this is a state court order I can

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workers' and police officers' reasonable belief that they had probable cause to enter Ms. Bey's home. Additionally, Ms. Bey has admitted she was given at least a portion of this warrant on May 2, 2018. She's now acknowledged that she received the full, two-page document so she had knowledge of it prior to her filing the amended complaint.

I find, as I mentioned before, that this document is integral to the complaint since its existence is largely determinative of Ms. Bey's allegations of unlawful entry.

Finally, I note that the Second Circuit in DiFalco also cautioned against relying on documents outside the complaint when there is a dispute as to the authenticity or accuracy see of the document. That's from DiFalco 622 F.3rd at 111.

Here, however, the plaintiff has not provided any reason for me to believe that this document is inauthentic, and indeed was served upon the plaintiff on May 2, 2018, with a signature as it appears now before me dated April 30, 2018.

Ms. Bey stated, but has not corroborated, that she received blank copies from the clerk's office at some point after or I guess on May 8, 2018. I'm not considering that as it's not been established that those copies exist nor had the circumstances for which those copies, assuming they exist giving rise to the production, been explained. I don't find

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it undermines what clearly presents to me as an authentic document of which I can take judicial notice; namely, this warrant dated April 30, 2018 authorizing the ACS workers and police officers to enter defendant's home, which they did on May 2, 2018.

Now the second issue is whether this Family Court order provides ACS workers and police officers, who are defendants in this case, with probable cause to enter Ms. Bev's home on May 2, 2018. There I find that it did.

As the Second Circuit has stated and as the defense has reiterated, in Southerland V. City of New York, 680 F.3rd 127 at 144, in note 15, which is a Second Circuit case from 2014, I quote: In child abuse investigations a Family Court order is equivalent to a search warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes.

This, Ms. Bey, is the case law that you may not be aware of but that governs here. Here the April 30, 2018, order signed by Judge Williams in the Family Court states that: The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that an abused or neglected child may be at the premises of plaintiff and therefore authorizes ACS works accompanied by the police to enter plaintiff's home in order to conduct a child protective investigation and to determine if children were present in the home.

The order also notes that the police could use force

to enter the home.

I realize, Ms. Bey, you complained about the fact that the officers entered through a window. But they were entitled to use force, which could have included breaking down your door. But they did not, rather they came in through an open window.

You mentioned a statement by one of the officers that they did need a warrant or because they were --

MS. BEY: He stated that, I asked the officer, excuse me, but where is your warrant? He said, I don't need a warrant, we're the police.

THE COURT: Right. Regardless of what he said or even what the ACS worker may have said later in the proceeding about their authority to enter or lack thereafter, that's irrelevant. Because in fact, they had the authority by virtue of this Family Court order of April 30, 2018. So those statements are not relevant to my decision, assuming that they were made.

Also, as I myself have previously stated in Wilson V. Sessoms-Newton reported at 2017 Westlaw 357-5240 page five on August 17, 2017: Absent exigent circumstances or some other exception, state actors must obtain a warrant before they enter the home to conduct a search or otherwise intrude on individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.

As I've indicated before, I'm aware that is the

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general standard. However, here I find, as I've said repeatedly, that the Family Court order which is based on a finding of probable cause, satisfies the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and that therefore, the defendants lawfully entered plaintiff's apartment pursuant to the April 30, 2018 order.

As I mentioned earlier, I'll reiterate, I also said this in the July 15, 2019 decision I issued, that even assuming for the purpose of this argument that it is not definitively established that the Family Court order is the equivalent of a Fourth Amendment or a warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes, I would find that the defendant officers were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity or are entitled to qualified immunity on this issue as I mentioned earlier.

Ms. Bey, I understand that you're not an attorney, but qualified immunity is a back stop for officers when they act with a reasonable belief in the legality of what they are doing. Where a reasonable officer, the standard is, could disagree with what they did as being illegal -- as being legal or not.

As the Second Circuit said in Cornejo V. Bell 592

F.3rd 121 at 128, which is a Second Circuit case from 2010:

Qualified immunity shields executive employee, which would

include ACS workers from civil liability under Section 1983 if

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it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate these clearly established rights by that. The question here is whether or not they had any reason to believe that their entry pursuant to this warrant violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. So I find that even if some for reason this warrant from the Family Court or order from the Family Court isn't the equivalent of a warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes, the officers acted with objective reasonableness in believing that it did and that it authorized their entry into your home.

So therefore, the officers cannot be sued for having -- or entitled to qualified immunity and cannot be sued for having engaged in that conduct pursuant to this Family Court warrant.

So this means, for all of these reasons that I am dismissing the May 2, 2018 unlawful entry claim against defendant Antoine who is mentioned earlier, defendant Caban Quintero, Toddman, Gellineau, and Epstein.

Having dismissed this claim, however, I do note that the following claims still remain in this action: An excessive force and false arrest claims -- I should have said excessive force and false claims against defendant Roke based on events of May 4, 2018.

MS. BEY: Excuse me, your Honor. There was a correction to the spelling of the officer's name by the

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- 1 defendant by corporation counsel. It's now R-O-C-K-E.
- MS. ROLON: That's correct, your Honor.
- THE COURT: We'll ask the clerk's office to note
- 4 that for the record, R-O-C-K-E.
- A false claim against defendant Mancilla based on
- 6 | the events of May 22, train. And an excessive force and false
- 7 | arrest claims -- excessive force and false arrest claim
- 8 against defendants Shey and Court Officer 6768 based on the
- 9 events of October 9, 2018. So those claims are still
- 10 proceeding.
- Of the remaining defendants, only defendant Mancilla
- 12 has been served. And to the extent that I referred to Corp.
- 13 | counsel as defense counsel, I understand that they don't
- 14 represent at this time the individual defendants, but simply
- 15 | represent -- who do you represent?
- 16 MS. ROLON: Just the City of New York as an
- 17 | interested party.
- 18 THE COURT: You said that earlier. Just the City of
- 19 New York as an interested party.
- 20 What has to happen next is proper service on all the
- 21 defendants. If you anticipate that you'll end up representing
- 22 | these individual defendants, is that the product of a lengthy
- 23 evaluation process?
- 24 MS. ROLON: There are several decisions that go into
- 25 | making a representation decision. I would like to note to the

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Court that we did provide service adjustments for the remaining defendants that we had. That was provided to

Ms. Bey by letter on November 26. Only one of which remains after your Honor's decision today.

THE COURT: It would be helpful if you file that as well so we have a record of it.

MS. ROLON: Certainly.

THE COURT: Rather than just your representation.

So given that the addresses have been provided, summonses will be completed as to those additional officers and then they will be served.

There is one defendant, Court Officer 6768, who appears to be a state official and the Court is currently awaiting more information from the New York State Attorney General's Office on how to serve that defendant. But once the other defendants, city defendants, in addition to Mancilla are served, then the City will determine whether or not they represent them and appearances will be entered. Or if these defendants end up with their own counsel, then hopefully their lawyers will make appearances and we'll go from there.

This process, Ms. Bey, may take a little bit of time.

MS. BEY: Understood.

THE COURT: We now know which claims are going forward. And in a month or two, perhaps over the holiday into

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the New Year, the case will proceed on those claims against those defendants who have been properly served.

MS. BEY: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else to address?

MS. ROLON: Yes, your Honor. If I just may add that one of the incidents, the May 22 arrest, we are under the impression it resulted in a conviction. And in plaintiff's complaint she's appealing that conviction. We would like clarification as it may inform our potential motion to stay.

THE COURT: You wanted clarification on?

MS. ROLON: Whether she's filing an appeal on the convicted arrest.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. BEY: I apologize. As far as the May 22 event, I am appealing that decision. It was just like your Honor, said I'm not a lawyer. You see I have several cases in front of different courts at one time. So the process ended up like stoped at a point, so I'm still in the process of appealing that decision, as I am still in court with the defendants that gave rise to that arrest. So basically I'm in civil court with the management agency that is involved with that complaint. And that outcome will be used in the appeal for the criminal decision.

THE COURT: Let me warn you of one thing. I can't give you any advice. As you probably know, there are time

limits that apply in appealing a criminal conviction. 1 2 have to pay attention to those. You had can't sit on your 3 rights with respect to your appeal. You should be thinking 4 about whether or not you need to notice your appeal in 5 criminal court without waiting. 6 MS. BEY: I noticed it. 7 THE COURT: Okay. You did so timely? 8 MS. BEY: Yes, I did so timely. 9 THE COURT: For your purposes, the City's purposes 10 that is, Corp. counsel more specifically, you should assume 11 she is appealing that criminal conviction arising out of the 12 May 22, 2018 arrest. 13 MS. ROLON: Thank you, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you all. I appreciate it. 15 MS. BEY: I want to clarify, since they are putting 16 the letter on the record, I don't have to provide the 17 addresses, correct? 18 That's correct. THE COURT: 19 (Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 20 21 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 22 23 Rivka Teich, CSR RPR RMR FCRR Official Court Reporter Eastern District of New York 24

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